no widely accepted international norms govern transboundary aquifers. 6 This gap, however, may be slowly lling as a result of the development of customary law, which is traceable, in large part, to the conduct of subnational actors.
International law is generally understood to emerge from formal and direct lawmaking actions by the larger international community. Treaties and conventions adopted by states represent formally accepted and codi ed norms of international law. 7 Another source of international law is de ned by customary international law. Customary international law is international law that emerges from a broad and consistent practice of states justi ed by a belief that such conduct is legally appropriate and mandated. 8 In the case of transboundary groundwater resources, while few formal international instruments focus on transboundary aquifers, 9 a growing number of subnational practices around the world suggest an emerging trend in the management of transboundary groundwater resources. Subnational political units are engaging in arrangements addressing the management of aquifers that traverse their international boundaries. In the European context, where most small international transboundary aquifers are now managed directly by local authorities under local transboundary arrangements, 10 this trend appears more formalized because of the European Outline Convention on the Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (European Outline Convention), which authorizes subnational units to enter into transboundary arrangements under certain circumstances. 11 In contrast, in North America, the respective federal governments have provided little if any guidance for, or shown any interest in, such local initiatives. Nonetheless, even in North America, it is safe to say that transboundary groundwater resources are now legitimate subjects for international cooperation. 12 The purpose of this article is to investigate more closely this trend and to identify speci c concepts resulting from such local initiatives that might serve as a basis for customary international law. While it is not intended as a comparative study in relation to the European experience, it presents the North American experience in a way that should be informative for such an inquiry in the future. Speci cally, this article focuses on the governance of transboundary groundwater resources in North America. It begins by identifying and reviewing various arrangements over transboundary aquifers between Mexico and the United States, between Canada and the United States, and between the continental states of the United States. 13 Although the arrangements discussed in this article represent diverse geographic and geologic conditions, commonalities in norms and principles can be identied in areas such as cooperation, prior noti cation of planned activities, sharing of data and information, public participation, and a preference for subsidiarity and local solutions for local issues.
This article proposes that many of these commonalitites evidence emerging state practice and should be considered and evaluated as bases for emerging customary international law. Moreover, recent trends suggest a change in the function of regional agreements and their role in the development of international custom as evidenced by the growing importance and effectiveness of local and regional transboundary arrangements 14 that are tailored to local characteristics and circumstances. Signi cantly, these trends are especially unique in that the majority of the arrangements identi ed are unof cial pacts without formal endorsement of the respective governments. Additionally, of those arrangements, the vast majority are subnational pacts rather than pacts between national governments. Ultimately, in identifying and characterizing such commonalities and characteristics, as well as the experiences on which they are based, this study aims to offer insight into evolving customary international law as well as suggestions for the development of new arrangements related to the management of transboundary groundwater resources.
(asserting that internationally shared groundwater resources are now 'a legitimate subject of international law').
13 Full text versions of all of the agreements discussed in this article can be found at <http:// www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
14 As used in this article, the phrase 'local and regional transboundary arrangements' denotes agreements over freshwater resources that traverse a political boundary. This includes arrangements between entities in different countries as well as those between subnational units. The term 'arrangement' is used to encompass agreements that may be those that are of cially or formally recognized by the respective governments as well as those that are either informal or non-binding agreements or those not formally recognized by the respective sovereign. An example of the latter is an internationally transboundary waters arrangement entered into by local entities on either side of a political border but which are not of cially recognized by the respective national governments.
I I. T H E A R R A NGEM EN T S 1. Mexico-United States Border
The problems that can arise from an international shared resource are clearly seen on the border between the United States and Mexico. The Mexico-US border extends more than 3,100 kilometres from the Gulf of Mexico to the Paci c Ocean 15 and overlies as many as twenty aquifers that traverse the international boundary. 16 No formal federal agreements exist between Mexico and the United States addressing the management, allocation, or protection of any of the border aquifers. However, a number of instruments encourage and facilitate cooperation between the two nations at the local and at the national levels in the management of transboundary aquifers.
A. Minutes of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)
The IBWC is a bi-national commission, composed of a Mexican and a United States section, responsible for enforcing water treaties and settling disputes on the Mexico-US border. 17 Minute 242 of the IBWC was enacted in August 1973. 20 It was designed to address the increasing salinity of the Colorado River and requires the United States to deliver water of a minimum water salinity level to Mexico. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Minute 242 also address groundwater in the border region. To the extent that these paragraphs create binding obligations, they represent the only evidence of a formal agreement between Mexico and the United States on the region's transboundary aquifers. Paragraph 5 provides that, pending the development of a 'comprehensive' groundwater agreement for the border region, both countries agree to limit groundwater pumping within a precisely de ned geographic region along the Arizona-Sonora border near San Luis to speci cally enumerated withdrawal targets. 21 Imposing a more aspirational obligation, paragraph 6 requires both countries to consult each other prior to pursuing any new development of surface or groundwater resources, or any other action, that could adversely impact the other country. This obligation, drafted with the stated goal of 'avoiding future problems,' applies to all transboundary aquifers along the border. 22 Another agreement that is relevant to the border's groundwater resources is Minute 289. 23 Enacted in November 1992, it is designed to address water quality in the lower Rio Grande River along the Mexico-US border. Although the majority of the minute focuses on the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers, paragraph 4 references the Integrated Border Environmental Plan adopted by Mexico and the United States in 1992 and calls for the establishment of a water monitoring program and database to observe surface and groundwater quality along the US-Mexico border. The paragraph also lists those agencies on both sides of the border that are to participate in the joint monitoring program. 24 serves as a principal source of freshwater for both communities: nearly 100 percent for Juárez, and approximately 30 percent for El Paso. 26 As a result of this dependence, the aquifer has undergone considerable mining in recent decades, and concerns have been raised over the aquifer's viability as an ongoing source of freshwater for the region.
B. Memorandum of Understanding between
In an effort to generate cooperation over the management and exploitation of the Hueco Bolson, the municipal utility companies of the two cities entered into a legally non-binding memorandum of understanding in 1999. This arrangement focuses on the region's groundwater by 'seek[ing] to identify the mechanisms between the parties to increase communications, cooperation, and implementation of transboundary projects of common interest.' In its stated goals of 'general objectives,' the Juárez-El Paso MOU alludes to data and information sharing related to transboundary natural resources and to cooperation in the management, use, and protection of natural resources that traverse an international boundary. 27
C. United States of America and the United Mexican States Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement) 28
The La Paz Agreement promotes cooperation for environmental protection on the border. While the agreement is not directly related to groundwater resources, it does contain general language that implicates transboundary aquifers. The treaty obligates both parties to prevent, reduce, and eliminate sources of pollution in their respective territory where such pollution affects the others' border region; cooperate in addressing environmental problems of mutual interest; and coordinate practical, legal, institutional, and technical measures designed to protect environmental quality in the border area, including coordinating national programs, scienti c and educational exchanges, environmental monitoring, environmental impact assessment, and regular exchanges of data and information on transboundary pollution originating in each country's territory. 29 It is noteworthy that none of the provisions in this agreement can prejudice or otherwise affect existing or 2. Canada-US Border As expansive as the Mexico-US border is, the border region between Canada and the United States is more than three times that length-approximately 11,370 kilometres. While this border region is also marked by diverse climates and geography, it contains far greater quantities of freshwater and nearly 300 transboundary waterways and aquifers. Unlike the Mexico-US region, Canada and the United States do not compete for groundwater resources primarily because of the abundance of surface water in the region. 36 Today, no formal agreement exists between the two nations directly addressing transboundary groundwater resources along the common border. Nonetheless, a number of agreements at various levels of government are relevant to transboundary aquifers.
A. Canada-US Agreements
The rst in a series of treaties relating to boundary waters between Canada and the United States, the 1909 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising between the United States and Canada provides the principles and mechanisms for preventing and resolving disputes over water quality and quantity along the Canadian-US boundary (Boundary Waters Treaty). 37 To achieve these goals, the treaty establishes the International Joint Commission (IJC), an independent bi-national organization created to prevent and resolve disputes relating to the use and quality of boundary waters along the Canadian-US border. 38 Although groundwater is not directly mentioned in the treaty, Article IV prohibits both countries from allowing 'boundary waters and waters owing across the boundary [to] be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.' 39 While the de nition of 'boundary waters' limits the term to surface waters, the article appears to contemplate other types of owing waters. Nevertheless, the Canadian government, through their embassy in Washington, DC, has explicitly indicated that they do not interpret the treaty as encompassing groundwater resources. 40 Groundwater, however, is considered in the Great Lake Water Quality Agreement (Great Lake Agreement), which was signed under the auspices of the IJC on 22 November 1978. 41 Although predominantly a surface water agreement, a number of the provisions refer to groundwater both expressly and impliedly. For example, Article VI(q) of the Great Lake Agreement, which is entitled 'Programs and Other Measures,' provides express reference to groundwater by requiring the parties to 'develop and implement programs and other measures to ful ll the purpose of [the] agreement,' including formulating 'programs for the assessment and control of contaminated groundwater and subsurface sources entering' the waters subject to the jurisdiction of the IJC. 42 Annex 16 to the treaty, entitled 'Pollution from Contaminated Groundwater,' provides additional details on the speci cs of the program, including identifying existing and potential sources of contaminated groundwater; mapping hydrogeological conditions of groundwater; developing a standard approach and procedure for sampling and analyzing groundwater to assess contamination and estimate contaminant loading from groundwater to the Great Lakes; and controlling contamination. 43 In addition, while not an explicit reference, Article 1 of the Great Lake Agreement offers a de nition for the 'Great Lakes System,' which reasonably can be interpreted to encompass related groundwaters. Article 1 de nes the term as all 'streams, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water that are within the drainage basin on the St. Lawrence River.' 44 While the focus of the Great Lake Agreement is on the surface waters of the Great Lakes, the language of the agreement provides both explicit and implicit obligations with regard to groundwater related to the Great Lakes that could impact the lakes through pollution. Charter). 45 While not legally binding, the Great Lakes Charter establishes a basis for the cooperative management of the Great Lakes founded on an understanding that the Great Lakes Basin should be 'recognized and treated as a single hydrologic system' and 'the natural resources and ecosystem of the Basin should be considered as a uni ed whole.' Signi cantly, it explicitly recognizes groundwater as an integral component of the Great Lakes Basin and encourages the parties to consider groundwater resources in all activities related to the basin. Moreover, it de nes 'withdrawal' from the basin as 'the removal or taking of water from surface or groundwater.' 46 The Great Lakes Charter commits all of the parties to cooperate at all levels of government to 'the study, monitoring, planning, and conservation of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin.' It emphasizes that the parties' 'shared responsibility to conserve and protect the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin for the use, bene t, and enjoyment of all their citizens' and urges them to implement appropriate legislation. Moreover, it recognizes the intent of the parties to notify and consult all relevant provinces and states prior to approving a permit or major new or increased diversion or consumptive use of Great Lakes waters. Finally, the Great Lakes Charter commits the parties to develop and exchange data and information, to coordinate relevant research efforts, and, more speci cally, to generate an inventory of the basin's surface and groundwater resources. 47 In the late 1990s, a process was initiated to strengthen the objectives of the Great Lakes Charter culminating in the Great Lakes Charter Annex, A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter (Annex 2001). 48 While also non-binding, the Annex 2001 commits the parties to develop a basin-wide binding arrangement based on a broad-based public participation program, the goal of which is to 'protect, conserve, restore, improve, and manage [the] use of the Waters and Water-Dependent Natural Resources of the Great Lakes Basin.' 49 The result of the Annex 2001's commitments was the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (Great Lakes Agreement), which was signed by the governors of the eight US states and the premiers of the two Canadian provinces on 13 December 2005. 50 The agreement establishes a 'Decision Making Standard for Management of Withdrawals and Consumptive Uses,' which is applicable to new water withdrawals and to increases to existing withdrawals over a set minimum volume. 51 Furthermore, it also strengthens the collection and sharing of technical data among the states and provinces and requires that the parties submit their water management programs implementing the compact for periodic review. 52 Signi cantly, the Great Lakes Agreement directly encompasses groundwater resources within its scope. It de nes 'water' as 'ground or surface water contained within the [Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River] basin' and de nes 'waters of the basin or basin water' as 'the Great Lakes and all streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels and other bodies of water, including tributary groundwater, within the Basin. 53 Under the agreement, though, the basin's surface water divide is used 'for the purpose of managing and regulating new or increased diversions, consumptive uses or withdrawals of . . . groundwater.' 54 While the Great Lakes Agreement is not intended to become a treaty and is not pursued at the national levels, the signatories have indicated their strong commitment to its terms. The Quebec national assembly has approved the agreement, while Ontario has actually incorporated the agreement into its domestic laws. 55 On the US side, the eight Great Lakes states are currently pursuing a parallel initiative-the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (Great Lakes Compact) 56 -which incorporates and would make the Great Lakes Agreement binding on the states. 57 As of 3 July 2008, Pennsylvania became the nal Great Lakes state to sign the compact. 58 All that remains for it to enter into force is for the US Congress to review and approve the arrangement in accordance with its responsibility under the US Constitution. 59 51 Ibid. at sec. 4.10 and 4.11. 52 See ibid. at sec. 59 Under the US Constitution, a compact between US states must be approved by the US Congress before it can enter into force. Once congressional approval is obtained, a compact carries the force of federal US law. US Const. art. 1 § 10, Clause 3. For additional discussion pertaining to compacts between US states addressing transboundary groundwater resources, see notes 66-83 in this article and accompanying text.
B. Great Lakes Charter and Its Progeny

C. Arrangements between the Canadian Province of British Columbia and the US State of Washington
Several regional arrangements are found along the US-Canadian border. One is the 1992 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the Province of British Columbia and the State of Washington (British ColumbiaWashington Agreement), which created the British Columbia-Washington Environmental Initiative and established the British Columbia-Washington Environmental Cooperation Council (British Columbia-Washington Council). 60 The British Columbia-Washington Agreement calls for regular meetings and the creation of subcommittees as necessary and includes a number of work priorities and preliminary action plans. The AbbotsfordSumas Aquifer, which is located along the US-Canada border, was one of the listed priorities requiring immediate joint action.
At the rst meeting of the British Columbia-Washington Council, the council created the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer International Task Force to respond to, and address, the identi ed issues. 61 This taskforce, consisting of representatives from federal and provincial agencies from both countries, has mainly focused on issues related to water quality in the aquifer. The main objectives of the taskforce are to develop a joint groundwater management plan; coordinate efforts aimed at protecting the aquifer; develop aquifer management strategies using a managerial approach; and facilitate and coordinate education and public involvement in water management issues.
In response to the concern for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, British Columbia and the State of Washington signed in 1996 the Memorandum of Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications (AbbotsfordSumas MOA). 62 The arrangement addresses the referral of water rights applications 'within or on the exterior boundaries' of the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer on both sides of the border. It de nes the roles and responsibilities of the relevant permitting agencies to allow timely prior consultation, comment period, and exchange of information on water quantity allocations within each party's territory, which 'could potentially signi cantly impact water quantity on the other side of the border.' It also provides for the sharing of studies addressing water availability and the development of water resources within or on the boundaries of the aquifer. The AbbotsfordSumas MOA speci cally applies to all surface water, groundwater, and reservoir waters.
A third arrangement in this region is the 1995 Interagency Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Washington Department of Ecology Eastern Regional Of ce and the Province of British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks Kootenay Region (Columbia River MOU). 63 This arrangement was designed to 'assure continued coordination and cooperation relative to major environmental issues within the international portion of the Columbia River drainage.' 64 While the Columbia River MOU only mentions groundwater in the scope of work attached to the document, and only with regard to discharges of ef uent, groundwater is implicated in the Columbia River MOU inasmuch as it is part of the Columbia River drainage basin. The MOU obligates the parties to: (1) provide timely prior noti cation of proposed discharges with potential for cross border water quality impacts; (2) 'provide an opportunity for comment on planning activities that may have trans-boundary impacts'; (3) share environmental data from the international portion of the Columbia River drainage system; (4) provide the opportunity to review and comment on projects or activities with potential to cause cross border impacts; (5) 'facilitate public information sharing meeting'; and (6) specify contacts to facilitate the timely sharing of information. 65 
Transboundary Arrangements within the United States
A. Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts are the preferred method for resolving transboundary water disputes in the United States. Compacts are like treaties in the sense that two sovereign states enter into an agreement over a transboundary resource. All interstate compacts in the United States require approval by the US Congress. 66 In the United States, twenty-six water allocation compacts are in force, at least four of which include the federal government as a signatory. 67 While no interstate compacts focus exclusively on a transboundary aquifer, a number of the allocation compacts do address interrelated groundwater resources. These include the yet-to-be-approved Great Lakes Compact discussed earlier 68 as well as the following arrangements.
The Susquehanna River Basin Compact, which was adopted in 1968 by New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the United States, 69 is one of the few interstate compacts that treat groundwater equally with surface water in terms of planning, allocation, and regulation of water use. The 1968 compact de nes 'waters' as meaning both surface and ground waters within the drainage area of the Susquehanna River. It states in Article 1.3 that '[t]he water resources of the basin are functionally interrelated, and the uses of these resources are interdependent' and, therefore, '[a] single administrative agency is . . . essential for effective and economical direction, supervision, and coordination of water resources efforts and programs.' 70 The 1968 compact also created a commission to assist in implementing the goals of the compact. Commission approval is required for all transboundary water projects; projects involving diversions of water into or from the basin; projects that may have a 'signi cant effect' on the water resources of another state party; and projects that are included within the scope of the commission's comprehensive plan for the development of water resources or that would have a 'signi cant effect' on the commission's plan. Towards these objectives, the parties agree to 'seek enactment of such additional legislation as will be required to enable' the commission to accomplish its obligations and duties. 71 In the western United States, Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska entered into the Republican River Compact in 1943. 72 This compact allocates the average annual water supply of the Republican River to each state in speci c proportions. 73 In 1998, Kansas led a complaint before the US Supreme Court alleging that Nebraska had violated the compact by allowing private well owners to pump groundwater hydraulically connected to the Republican River and its tributaries. 74 Kansas claimed Nebraska was using more water than its allocation under the compact, thus depriving Kansas of its full entitlement. Colorado was joined in the lawsuit because it is a party to the compact and the headwaters of the Republican River rise within Colorado. Following protracted negotiations, the three states entered into a settlement agreement. Among other things, the states agreed to include in the count of each state's allocation groundwater withdrawals that are determined to deplete stream ow in the Republican River or its tributaries. 76 The 77 Unlike the Republican River Compact, which allocated water in proportions, the Arkansas River Compact, signed in 1948 by the states of Colorado and Kansas, equally allocates the waters of the Arkansas River and their utilization between the two states. 78 It also equally allocates the bene ts arising from the construction, operation, and maintenance of the then-planned John Martin Reservoir. Article IV-D of the compact provides that all future development of the Arkansas River Basin must not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability of water in the river to other users of the river's waters. 79 In 2001, the US Supreme Court interpreted this provision to include the development of groundwater resources within the basin. 80 The Upper Niobrara River Compact, which was signed in 1962 by the states of Wyoming and Nebraska, was principally designed to apportion equitably the surface waters of the Upper Niobrara River Basin. 81 However, the compact also acknowledges that groundwater could become an important source of irrigation water, and, therefore, it established a secondary objective of compiling and assessing information on 'groundwater and underground water ow' that would assist in the future apportionment of such waters. 82 According to Article VI(a) of the compact, groundwater would not be apportioned 'until such time as adequate date [sic] on groundwater of the basin are available.' Articles VI further provides that to obtain the necessary data, the two states shall cooperate and shall bear all costs equally. 83 76 The Truckee River Basin, located in California and Nevada, has been a source of contention for nearly a century. Demand for the waters of this basin has often been greater than its supply. As a result, beginning in 1935 with the rst Truckee River Agreement, various arrangements were devised to allocate the waters of the basin. 85 In 1990, the US Congress enacted the Truckee-Carson Act, which equitably allocates the waters of the Truckee River, Lake Tahoe, and the Carson River between the two states. 86 Although the act primarily focuses on surface water, it recognizes the interrelated nature of surface and groundwater. Section 204(a)(5) of the Truckee-Carson Act ensures that both states, individually or collectively, can study the use of surface water to enable the conjunctive use of groundwater. Sections 204(b)(1) and 204(c)(1) include groundwater in the computation of allowable diversions from Lake Tahoe and the Truckee River, respectively. Moreover, the Act recognizes groundwater as an integral source of freshwater and prioritizes groundwater use based on the location of extraction. For example, under section 204(c)(1)(C), any use of groundwater in Nevada, which is extracted from groundwater related to the Truckee River in California, is subordinate to existing and future uses of groundwater in California. 87 In addition, the Truckee-Carson Act establishes a 'safe yield' standard in the management of groundwater interrelated to the Truckee River Basin. In section 204(c)(1)(C), the act provides that any use of groundwater in Nevada shall cease to the extent that it causes extractions to exceed the safe yield as determined by the United States Geological Survey and California law. 88 Furthermore, the Truckee-Carson Act, under section 210(b)(16), requires the secretary of the US Department of the Interior to 'undertake appropriate measures to address signi cant adverse impacts' on domestic uses of groundwater that result directly from the water purchases by the Act. 89 Such measures must be in consultation with of cials from the state of Nevada and 'affected local interests.' The provisions of this Act are to be implemented by a Truckee River Operating Agreement, which is being developed by the 
Ibid
C. General Arrangements between US States
Another source of cooperation is that pursued between subnational states. In the United States, these are unof cial arrangements with no legal implications because they lack congressional approval. 91 Nonetheless, such arrangements are similar to those between subnational units in international transboundary scenarios. 92 For example, the Pullman-Moscow Aquifer Inter-Agency Agreement between the States of Washington and Idaho was adopted by the Washington Department of Ecology and the Idaho Department of Water Resources to promote coordination on the management of the Palouse Basin Aquifer (Palouse Basin Agreement). 93 Entered into on 18 April 1992, this arrangement formalizes the role of the previously organized Palouse Basin Aquifer Committee (PBAC) in managing the Palouse Basin Aquifer. 94 The PBAC has developed a coordinated groundwater management plan that sets goals and action plans for the improved management of the aquifer. The present arrangement requires the states to share information on new groundwater allocation permits as well as changes to old permits and requires that decisions on such requests be guided by the PBAC's groundwater management plan. While nal authorization remains with the respective state agencies, the arrangement also requires that all new permits and proposed change-of-permit applications be submitted to the PBAC for review, evaluation, and recommendation.
Another based on a jointly developed computer model for groundwater ow that permits water managers on both sides of the border to enter data about a proposed withdrawal and determine whether the withdrawal would affect regional water levels. 96 Of note, the MOA establishes a collaborative 'modeling committee' of experts from both states who are assigned the responsibility of managing and securing the computer model and ensuring that all updates are agreed upon by both sides. The committee also assesses proposed enhancements to the model as well as the direction of research intended to enhance the model. 97 Along the Atlantic coast, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (GA-EPD) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC-DHEC) entered into the Letter Agreement between the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, Department of Natural Resources and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement) regarding salt-water encroachment in the Hilton Head-Savannah border area on 25 October 1995. 98 The agreement details a ten-year program to develop a joint strategy for addressing groundwater quality and quantity problems in the Floridian Aquifer, which traverses the border of the two states. The Letter Agreement indicates that Georgia would develop a groundwater management strategy and undertake certain groundwater conservation measures to complement similar activities already in place in South Carolina. It also indicates that the states agree on reducing withdrawals in speci c locations on both sides of the border as a means to address groundwater quality and quantity issues. 99 While the initial arrangement was set for ten years, the states have continued their cooperative efforts in the context of Georgia's Coastal Sound Science Initiative (CSSI) 100 and have worked with the US Geological Survey to model the region's groundwater resources in an effort to determine how best to manage them. In a related matter, the governors of the two states created in June 2005 a bi-state Savannah River Committee as a forum for discussing issues of mutual interest related to the waters of the Savannah River Basin. 106 The 1945 Decree focuses exclusively on surface water. This decree, however, recognizes that reservoirs on the North Platte River could lose some water as a result of 'ground absorption and storage.' 107 Moreover, the 1945 Decree acknowledges that 'seepage' was the property of the appropriator even though the water originated from a surface source and may have previously been used. 108 In sharp contrast, the 2001 Decree explicitly recognizes that surface and groundwater resources may be hydraulically related and, albeit implicitly, that hydraulically related water resources should be managed comprehensively. For example, the 2001 Decree enjoins the state of Wyoming from diverting water for irrigation purposes from the North Platte River 'and its tributaries, including water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells.' It further notes that the consumptive use of irrigation water encompassed under this injunction 'shall include . . . [w]ater consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated by water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells.' 109
I I I. E M E RGI NG S TAT E PR AC T IC E?
Although the water resources from the above arrangements range dramatically in location, geology, and use, it is possible to discern a number of normative commonalities that appear applicable regardless of geography or local conditions. These include such areas as cooperation, data and information sharing, joint monitoring, public participation, and a preference for subsidiarity and for developing local solutions for local issues. To the extent that the appearance of these principles in the various instruments constitutes a trend, they may evidence emerging state practice.
Cooperation
One of the most important factors that can determine the success of an arrangement cannot be found in the text. A large part of water issues are political. Therefore, the non-tangible goals and attitudes of the parties and the manner in which they approach the negotiations are vital parts of the process. 110 The arrangement needs to be exible enough to deal with different situations surrounding shared groundwater but speci c enough to demand the cooperation necessary. 111 Some form of cooperation is explicitly present in almost every one of the earlier listed arrangements. The presence of an agreement, formal or informal, indicates at least an implicit measure of cooperation among the parties. Cooperation can be applied to a variety of groundwater-related issues ranging from the research of a resource to the management and development and even the protection of an aquifer. It can require a party to recognize that more than one entity has a right to a water resource as well as acknowledge the role of water in different cultures and its importance in spirituality and creating a sense of place.
This obligation is often written as a re ection of the overall purpose of the arrangement. All of the United States-Mexico arrangements have a cooperation component related to the use of the particular aquifer as well as the limits on withdrawal. For example, Minute 242 obligates both parties to restrict groundwater withdrawal on both sides of the border within ve miles of the Arizona-Sonora boundary near San Luis, 112 while the Juárez-El Paso MOU obligates the cities of Juárez and El Paso to develop and coordinate a compatible plan 'to secure water supplies and extend the life of the Hueco Bolson.' 113 In contrast, along the US-Canada border, cooperation appears to be equally concerned with water quality and quantity. For example, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, the 1995 Columbia River MOU, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, and the 2005 Great Lakes Compact include cooperation requirements related to both groundwater quantity and quality issues. 114 At times, the type of cooperation required appears to be more basic. In the case of the Great Lakes Charter, the parties agree to cooperate in de ning, studying, and managing the resource. 115 The 1992 British ColumbiaWashington Agreement requires cooperation in meeting regularly and coordinating actions in response to shared concerns. 116 In other cases, the obligation to cooperate is implicit. Neither the Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement nor the Georgia-South Carolina MOA explicitly mandate cooperation between the parties. Yet, the two arrangements are built on the understanding that they must cooperate if they are to accomplish their objectives. 117 Whether or not an arrangement explicitly speci es cooperation, it is a critical part of any successful accord to share a resource. In its absence, other objectives will be dif cult, if not impossible, to achieve. Although 112 Minute 242, supra note 20 at para. 5. 113 Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 at para. 3(e). 114 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 37 (discussing International Joint Commission approval of future diversions and other activities with possible transboundary affect in Articles III and IV, cooperation on Niagara River water levels above the falls in Article V, and cooperation in the apportionment of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers and their tributaries in Article VI; also discussing an agreement not to cause pollution resulting in injury of health or property to the other party in Article IV); 1995 Columbia River MOU, supra note 63 (recognizing in the MOU and Article III(a) and (b) of Attachment 1 to the MOU that the parties 'mutually agree to' cooperate over new discharges and consumptive uses); 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 50 (specifying the agreed-upon requirements on existing and new diversions and withdrawals in Articles 200-3 and 205 and those relating to water quality in Articles 201 and 203); 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 (regulating diversions and withdrawals in Articles 4.8-4.11 and 4.14; creating an inventory of water data related to existing quantities and proposed withdrawals, diversions and consumptive uses, as well as reporting requirements for certain withdrawals, diversions and consumptive uses in Article 4.1, and describing water conservation and ef ciency requirements in Article 4.2; imposing some criteria on water quality in Article 4.9 for water returned or introduced into the basin, and conditioning withdrawals on ensuring remaining water quality in Article 4.11).
115 1985 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45 (providing in Principle II that the parties 'recognize and commit to a spirit of cooperation . . . in the study, monitoring, planning, and conservation of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin').
116 1992 British Columbia-Washington Agreement, supra note 60, at attached terms of reference and preliminary action plan/work priorities. 117 See generally notes 98-103 in this article and accompanying text.
working together is a necessary component of any successful arrangement, sometimes more proactive obligations must also be present.
Prior Noti cation of Planned Activities
A logical extension of cooperation is advance noti cation of activity by one party that may adversely affect the other parties who share the water source. 118 Within this requirement is a range of compliance alternatives. Some of the arrangements reviewed require mere noti cation of the activity, while others impose more stringent criteria and require additional procedures for informing another state of planned activities. Minute 242 is an example of the most basic consultation arrangement simply requiring the parties in paragraph 6 to consult each other prior to new development of water resources or any action that would adversely impact the other party. 119 The Great Lakes Charter offers more detailed obligations in the section on implementation of principles and consultation procedures by requiring noti cation of all relevant provinces and states prior to 'any new or increased diversion or consumptive use' in excess of 5,000,000 gallons and speci es opportunities for objecting to, and consulting over, such proposals. 120 Its progeny, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement also calls for prior notice and commenting opportunities in Article 205 for certain new and increase-in-use applications. 121 In the case of the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, the arrangement calls on the relevant permitting agencies to provide a comment period to their counterparts across the border before approving a water quantity allocation. 122 In a somewhat different approach, the 1995 Columbia River MOU allows for timely consultation but, unlike the other arrangements, also incorporates an opportunity for 'transboundary public comment.' 123
Sharing of Data and Information
In order to protect a resource, it must rst be understood. The realization that a shared water arrangement is necessary often predates the full understanding of the resource. For this reason, a common aspect of state practice involves the sharing of data and information between users of a 118 This and many of the other principles discussed in this article are well recognized in the international law of transboundary resources, which lends support to their application in the context of shared groundwater resources.
119 Minute 242, supra note 20, at para. 123 1995 Columbia River MOU, supra note 63 (requiring in the MOU for timely noti cation and commenting opportunities for proposed new discharges as well as for proposed new consumptive uses as described in detail in Article III(a) and (b) of Attachment 1 to the MOU on Scope of Work).
shared water resource. Common data collection includes water quality testing, aquifer modeling, monitoring water table levels, and aquifer mapping.
The particulars of what is incorporated into the data collection provision is dependent on local speci cs, but its presence, in some form, is critical to continued understanding and prudent stewardship.
Data collection can be necessary to create speci c use regulations or it can be part of ongoing operation and maintenance. An arrangement written in the early stages of resource development may be more expansive. In the Republican River Compact, three states agreed to the development of a comprehensive model of the relationship between aquifer withdrawals and the Republican River. In other locations, where research has already taken place, data collection may be less inclusive or speci c. For example, in El Paso, Texas, the Hueco Bolson Aquifer has been heavily studied and modeled in an effort to gain accurate future water availability estimates. However, in the MOU between the local water utilities on either side of the border, both parties agree to share any newly gained information regarding transboundary water resources. To a limited extent, the US-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act contemplates expanding existing arrangements related to archiving and sharing relevant data. 124 Provisions for joint sharing of data and information also can be found in a number of arrangements focusing on the US-Canada border. The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement includes a biennial meeting to share monitoring data provided by both parties. The 1985 Great Lakes Charter recognizes joint monitoring of the water resources in the second principle, which focuses on cooperation. This mandate is later expanded by a description of a joint database 'and the establishment of systematic arrangements for the exchange of water data and information.' 125 Unlike other arrangements, detailed information is provided about the form and type of data that must be supplied as part of monitoring efforts.
The Great Lakes Compact provides that a chief purpose of the compact is '[t]o facilitate the exchange of data, strengthen the scienti c information base upon which decisions are made and engage in consultation on the potential effects of proposed Withdrawals and losses on the Waters and Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin.' 126 Similarly, parties to the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA must 'cooperate in sharing relevant water quantity information necessary to provide management of those water resources.' 127 The arrangement between the cities of El Paso and Ciudad 124 See US-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, supra note 31 at Article 4(b)(2)(B).
125 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45. 126 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 at Article 1.3(2)(e). 127 Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62.
Juarez also recognizes the history of, and implicates the continued need for, shared technical information about the Hueco Bolson Aquifer. 128
Public Participation
The inclusion of the public is paramount to achieving success in any shared use arrangement. True participation means that no one is excluded from participation in the decision-making processes and institutions necessary for human survival and ful lment, including those relating to water. 'Public involvement holds the promise of improving the management of international watercourses and reducing the potential for con ict over water issues.' 129 Participation improves the quality of decisions, facilitates the decisionmaking process, improves credibility, and enhances implementation. 130 A number of the documents reviewed explicitly list public participation as a condition of the arrangement. For example, the second directive of the Great Lakes Charter Annex speci cally calls for the governors and premiers to commit to a process that ensures public input. The 1995 Columbia River MOU provides the public an 'opportunity to review and comment in writing or verbally on a proposal under consideration by the agency with jurisdiction.' 131 The Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement is more speci c, requiring public meetings and hearings to establish a 'Coastal Groundwater Management Strategy.' 132 Public meetings with suf cient notice are also a condition of the Susquehanna River Basin Commission. 133 Often, some arrangements do not overtly call for public participation but, rather, incorporate public participation opportunities through other de ned processes. For example, the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer has an active stakeholder group that includes concerned citizens as well as representatives from federal, provincial, and local government agencies. 134 The Truckee River has a comparable watershed council. 135 Domestic legal requirements can also promote participation by requiring public dissemination of proposed projects with opportunities for public comment. The SVRP MOA, for example, requires the Model Committee, which is organized by the ldaho Department of Water Resources in conjunction with the Washington Department of Ecology, to establish protocols and procedures for publicly disseminating updated versions of the groundwater ow model of the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer. 136 In addition, US interstate compacts adopted by US state legislatures, such as those on the Arkansas and Republican rivers, are subject to domestic state procedures, which typically include public hearings and comment opportunities. Although it is more effective to ensure participation by speci cally including it in an arrangement, such secondary opportunities can still encourage involvement by interested stakeholders.
Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity suggests that social decision making ought to be handled by the lowest level of competent authority. 137 It emphasizes a bottom-up approach and contends that those with the greatest interest in the resolution of a problem are best suited to respond to the problem. 138 In consequence, the principle re ects a presumption for a decentralization of decision making. 139 Accordingly, subsidiarity is justi ed on the grounds that 'decentralized decisions generally, but not always, will be better informed, will better re ect the values and preferences of those affected, will be more adaptable to improving knowledge and changing circumstances, and will lead to better results in terms of maintaining a sustainable human environment.' 140 Another advantage relates to the degree of agility with which local of cials can respond to a water challenge as compared to of cials at higher and more distant levels of government.
While the nations of North America do not formally subscribe to the principle of subsidiarity by name, the concepts of federalism in all three countries do re ect signi cant deference to subnational decision-making bodies. As a result, a de facto system of subsidiarity arguably exists for addressing transboundary groundwater resources on the continent. The majority of the documents examined in this study evidence a pattern of local authorities tackling local groundwater challenges without involving the national governments of the respective nations. Signi cantly, such initiatives were taken at various levels of local and regional government. The Juárez-El Paso MOU, for example, represents an effort taken at the lowest political level-the public water utilities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez-in an effort to address the challenges posed by the transboundary utilization of the Hueco Bolson Aquifer. 141 The British Columbia-Washington Agreement, the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, and the Columbia River MOU also constitute examples of a de facto system of subsidiarity, albeit at a higher level of authority. All three arrangements were pursued and implemented at the state and province levels for the purpose of addressing transboundary groundwater resources along the border between Washington State and the province of British Columbia. 142 The same can be said of the Great Lakes Charter and its progeny, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement and 2005 Great Lakes Compact. 143 Within the United States, subsidiarity appears to be more of cially sanctioned to the extent that the US Constitution reserves to the states all power and authority not delegated to the federal government or prohibited by the Constitution. 144 Thus, the various compacts between US states considered in this article represent more of a de jure system of subsidiarity, albeit with some national oversight in the guise of congressional approval. 145 To a similar extent, the Palouse Basin Agreement, the SVRP MOA, the Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, and Georgia-South Carolina MOA also constitute examples of subsidiarity in the context of addressing transboundary groundwater resources. 146 However, since they do not require congressional approval, they might be classi ed as examples of de facto subsidiarity.
contemplate cross-border groundwater resources, they do so very indirectly and only as a secondary or tertiary concern.
Of the remaining twelve instruments, as well as the six US compacts reviewed, all can be construed as either unof cial international (meaning that they are not formally recognized by the respective sovereigns) arrangements or subnational transboundary arrangements. As such, they are not binding under international law and provide little if any evidence of international law or obligations. Yet, all of these arrangements are noteworthy because, to varying extents, all of them directly address groundwater issues that traverse political boundaries. Two complementary conclusions can be drawn from this fact.
The rst suggests that the countries of North America have found it more practical to manage transboundary aquifers at the local, rather than at the national, level. Although similar in concept to the principle of subsidiarity discussed earlier, 148 it is not based on political or social interests. Rather, it is a function of practicality and is readily understood when considering the appropriateness of a global versus a local approach to the management of freshwater resources in general. While global framework agreements for transboundary water resources may yet prove to be functional, 149 detailed global arrangements are probably ineffective and inappropriate primarily because the circumstances and conditions of each transboundary water body make it globally unique. Aquifers often affect a restricted community with individual concerns. 150 Geologic, hydrologic, and climatic characteristics, as well as distinctive social, developmental, cultural, and other factors, often require very speci c considerations of local circumstances. Moreover, although concerns addressed in disparate regions may appear facially similar, the water challenge in each is typically locally unique necessitating locally tailored solutions. 151 The majority of arrangements discussed in this article illustrate the advantages of a regional approach. They address local concerns in a way that is both re ective of, and responsive to, local and regional cultures, knowledge, needs, and capabilities. For example, the management techniques and allocation regimes employed for the Hueco Bolson Aquifer underlying the city of El Paso in Texas, United States, and Ciudad Juarez, in Chihuahua, Mexico, is entirely inappropriate for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer found along the border between the US state of Washington and the Canadian province of British Columbia. While the rst is an alluvial aquifer located in an arid climate with a rapidly growing population, where the aquifer serves as one of the few sources of water for the entire region, the latter is a mostly unconned aquifer composed of uncompacted glacial sands and gravels in a more temperate climate. 152 In these two examples, local of cials were best able to determine the appropriate mechanism for their unique water challenges. In the case of the Hueco Bolson Aquifer, the municipal utility companies of the bordering sister cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez responded to their unique water challenge by entering into a memorandum of understanding that focuses on cooperation and the exchange of information. 153 In the case of the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, a series of arrangements were forged at the state and provincial level discussing the roles and interaction of relevant permitting agencies and providing for consultation and the exchange of information, as well as creating a joint task force to develop, among others, a joint management plan and aquifer management strategies. 154 The second conclusion that may be derived from the fact that all of the arrangements directly address groundwater issues traversing political boundaries is that, to the extent that these pacts indicate how nations behave in relation to such resources, they may be considered as evidence for the development of customary international law. An assessment of the twelve unof cial international arrangements suggests that the countries of North America allow subnational political units to enter into arrangements example, may dictate the level of administrative authority necessary to respond to the issues and challenges posed. Thus, where an aquifer or aquifer basin at issue is contained within a limited region, local control of decision-making may suf ce. However, where the water challenge involves an aquifer or aquifer basin that transects a much larger area, a local arrangement may be less effective and appropriate. addressing transboundary aquifers. At the very least, it suggests that the countries overlook such conduct. In either case, the result is state practice for the purpose of determining customary international law, which, in this case, might be interpreted as a preference by the nations of North America for local solutions to transboundary groundwater issues. A similar conclusion can be derived from a review of the six US compacts presented earlier. 155
V. C ONC LUSION
The growing reliance on local and regional agreements for addressing water challenges posed by transboundary groundwater resources in North America indicates a trend in how various levels of government respond to such challenges. Local and regional authorities are no longer waiting for the national governments to exercise jurisdiction over transboundary shared aquifers. Rather, they are negotiating and dealing with their water challenges on their own and at their own levels of authority. At the same time, though, the national governments of North America seem to ignore, if not tolerate, such conduct. This approach appears to differ somewhat from the European experience where local authorities have explicit authority to enter into cross-border arrangements under the European Outline Convention. 156 Nonetheless, the fact that so many of these arrangements are concluded at the local level certainly suggests the development of state practice in North America on the subject. Moreover, it indicates that transboundary groundwater resources are a legitimate subject for international cooperation.
Many of the principles shared by the various North American arrangements discussed in this article are well-recognized aspects of international law and those of transboundary resources generally. These principles are now applied in the groundwater context at a regional level. To the extent that such arrangements represent state practice, they may evidence evolving customary international law in the eld. Moreover, both the formats of these agreements and the included normative commonalities can be construed as contributing to such development. To some extent, this may be a trend 155 While interstate arrangements between subnational political units do not necessarily provide evidence of international state practice, they can, at the very least, be instructive because the issues addressed between the units sharing an aquifer are virtually identical to those experienced among nations sharing an aquifer. Moreover, applying national legal constructs to international law is not unique. For example, the internationally accepted 'equitable and reasonable utilization' norm evolved from the 'equitable apportionment' principle developed the by US Supreme Court in its settlement of interstate disputes among US states. See S.C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, at 305 (2001) . 156 See European Outline Convention, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
by omission-meaning that by staying out of the arrangements achieved at the local and regional levels, the national governments have acted in a manner that establishes state practice. Regardless, this trend should not be ignored. Moreover, the appropriateness and applicability of the principles at the heart of this trend should be considered seriously in the context of other transnational groundwater situations. Considering the experiences and results of the arrangements discussed in this article, these principles may serve as effective tools for successfully managing shared groundwater resources.
